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llaborative Efforts in Cognitive 
erapy with Religious Clients 
R. MCMINN and CATHIE J. LEBOLD 
therapy requires an under· 
of and tolerance for the reli· 
views of clients. Collaborative 
llniiOL!es in cognitive therapy are de· 
ond ideological obstacles in 
cognitive therapy with religious 
are considered. It is suggested 
confronting clients' religious beliefs 
curiOIOC!IICC:n or absolutistic is dini· 
inappropriate. Beck's and 
collaborative techniques 
sed as important clinical 
in working with religious 
utcome studies of the usefulness of 
cognitive therapy have proliferated in 
recent years, reflecting the popularity 
the cognitive approaches. Numerous 
have demonstrated the effectiveness 
therapy with unipolar depres-
(Beck, Hollon, Bedrosian, & 
1985; Blackburn, Bishop, Glenn, 
, & Christie, 1981; Dobson & Shaw, 
McNamara & Horan, 1986; Murphy, 
Wetzel, & Lustman, 1984; Reynolds 
, 1986; Rush, Beck, Kovacs, & 
Shaw, Simons, Lustman, 
& Murphy, 1985; Simons, Murphy, 
& Wetzel, 1986; Taylor & Marshall, 
Teasdale, Fennell, Hibbert, & Amies, 
Other effective uses of cognitive 
have also been documented, in-
for reprints should be sent to Mark R. 
PhD, Department of Psychology, George Fox 
Newberg, Oregon 97132. 
eluding cognitive-behavioral therapy for 
hypochondriasis (Salkovskis & Warwick, 
1986), postdivorce adjustment (Graff, White-
head, & LeCompte, 1986), childhood dis-
orders (Meador & Ollendick, 1984; Swanson, 
1985), test anxiety (Dendata & Diener, 1986), 
and reduction of Type A tendencies 
man, 1985a, 1985b). 
The effectiveness of cognitive therapy for 
a variety of problems has been established. 
Attention can now be turned to the ques-
tions of specific effectiveness addressed by 
outcome researchers of other forms of psy-
chotherapy Strupp, 1978). Which cog-
nitive therapists work best with which clients 
which techniques? After reviewing the 
literature on cognitive-behavioral treatment 
of depression, Williams (1984) concluded 
that an area requiring further investigation is 
"specifying which technique works for which 
patient and at what stage in the time-course 
of the disorder" (p. 259). Although Williams 
was not referring to religious variables, it 
seems clear that an open consideration of 
client and therapist religious values is essen-
tial when considering client-therapist match-
ing (Beit-Hallahmi, 1975; McMinn, 1984). 
Because psychologists tend to be non-
religious and sometimes lack sophistication 
in understanding religious thought, Bergin 
(1980) suggested that religious values of 
clients need more consideration in the prac-
tice and evaluation of psychotherapy. A simi-
lar argument has recently emerged in the 
psychiatric literature (Larson, Pattison, Blazer, 
Omran, & Kaplan, 1986). A compelling rea-
son to better understand religious values is 
that nonreligious therapists tend to view reli-
gious clients as more responsible for their 
problems than nonreligious clients (Houts & 
Graham, 1986). Peteet (1981), Sacks (1985), 
and Stovich 0985) correctly concluded that 
sensitivity to and awareness of clients' reli-
gious traditions is an important element of 
effective treatment. 
Moreover, clients with religious values ex-
pect their values to be respected in therapy. 
A recent survey showed that 79% of respon-
dents believed religious values were impor-
tant to discuss in therapy. Over half of the 
respondents preferred to seek therapy at a 
pastoral counseling center (Quackenbos, 
Privette, & Klentz, 1985). 
Collaborative Empiricism in 
Cognitive Therapy 
Although the cognitive therapies have cer-
tain commonalities, they also have distinc-
tions. For example, Albert Ellis (1962) at-
tempts to identify and dispute irrational 
beliefs quite immediately in the process of 
rational-emotive therapy (RET). In contrast, 
Aaron Beck's (1976) cognitive therapy for 
depression is first oriented toward discover-
ing internal communications and automatic 
thoughts. In order to evaluate these internal 
communications and automatic thoughts, 
Beck suggested the therapist and client col-
laborate by deriving appropriate "experi-
ments." Those automatic thoughts eventually 
do lead the therapist to the maladaptive un-
derlying assumptions which are similar to 
Ellis's irrational beliefs. Donald Meichen-
baum's 0977) cognitive-behavior therapy 
differs from both Beck and Ellis in that 
Meichenbaum does not search for a single 
scheme or irrational belief. Rather, he collab-
orates with clients in creating a fiction to ex-
plain behavior. That fiction then becomes a 
guide to more effective behavior and control 
of emotions (Meichenbaum, 1987). 
Both Beck and Meichenbaum emphasized 
the need for therapist and client to collabo-
rate whereas RET tends to be more teaching 
oriented and may involve more direct con-
frontation. As a hypothetical example, con-
sider a 25-year-old depressed woman who 
feels she is failing in her career because she 
was recently passed over for promotion. A 
rational-emotive therapist would teach her 
that her emotions are not as much related to 
loss of promotion as to her beliefs. 
ample, she may believe that if she is 
very best employee then she is a 
ure. By teaching her to dispute the 
belief, a rational-emotive therapist 
help her realize that the loss of one 
tion does not mean she is failing. 
A therapist employing Beck's 
therapy might collaborate with this 
constructing an experiment. Since 
lieves she is failing in her work, she 
be instructed to interview ten 
and two supervisors about their 
her work performance. This 
might help modify her automatic 
that she is a failure. 
A therapist employing Meic 
cognitive-behavior therapy might use 
oration to develop a "healthy 
script." For example, using what 
baum (1987) called a "Columbo 
a therapist might verbally note the 
that this client is telling herself 
make her feel bad and yet seems to 
improve, as evidenced by her 
participate in therapy. The woman 
then decide to explore alternate ways 
ing to herself in order to change her 
Although all cognitive therapies 
rational, logical intervention, 
the 1984 World Congress on 
Therapy noted that, despite the 
of cognitive therapies, emotions can 
distorted thinking and emotions and 
tions can occur simultaneously 
1984). Thus, it is important to find 
broaden cognitive therapies beyond 
sumptions on which they were 
Beck (Beck & Padesky, 1987) and 
baum (1987) appear to be using 
tion to better include affective 
their therapies. Rather than being 
linear perspective (such as Ellis's 
model) where irrational beliefs cause 
tive emotions, Beck's and 
emphasis on collaboration allows for 
teractional view of emotions and 
With such an interactional view, 
serve an important role in identifying 
cognitions. Cognitions evoked by 
emotional states can then be 
using collaborative methods. 
Cognitive Therapy with Religious 
Clients 
Understanding clients' religious values 
be especially important in cognitive 
where beliefs and schemas are rou-
evaluated and systematically changed. 
(1987) concluded that "there has 
been a danger that the rational or 
therapies have underplayed the 
played by values in the urge to stress 
importance of rationality and logic" (p. 
The role of religious values in cogni-
therapy has received little research at-
' tention, perhaps because of the relative 
.·.newness of the cognitive therapies. A few 
empirical studies and theoretical works have 
been published. 
Bruun (1985) reported a case study where 
cognitive therapy was combined with reli-
. gious strategies for effective outcome. It illus-
.ttated the positive potential of matching a re-
ligious client with a religious therapist but 
doesn't address broader issues of client-ther-
apist matching. 
Pecheur and Edwards (1984) compared 
secular and religious versions of cognitive 
·.therapy for depression. They found both ver-
of cognitive therapy to be more effec-
than a waiting list control condition. No 
···n1mnnrr1P difference between secular and reli-
versions was found. However, the 
is limited by two problems. First, Chris-
therapists were used for both groups. 
only difference in therapy was the ex-
use of their belief system in cognitive 
Second, subjects were Chris-
in both treatment conditions. Although 
study yields interesting results, it does 
address questions of client-therapist 
Propst Cl980a) reported use of religious 
imagety to be superior to nonreli-
imagery in treating mild depression. 
in her study were nonreligious 
understanding of religious value systems. 
~~\j;.lle11ts in the religious imagety group were 
matched with clients in the stan-
imagery group. Propst's study suggests 
tat least some forms of cognitive therapy 
can be modified to be more effective with 
religious clients, even when the therapy is 
delivered by nonreligious therapists who are 
understanding of their clients' values. 
In addition to the empirical studies report-
ed above, two authors have compared spiri-
tual and cognitive treatment approaches the-
oretically. Propst Cl980b) suggested a parallel 
between cognitive restructuring and evangel-
ical approaches, especially with regard to the 
uses of imagery. Tan (1987) used principles 
from Scripture to construct a biblical ap-
proach to therapy that is largely cognitive-
behavioral in orientation and practice, but 
more broad-based and comprehensive than 
secular cognitive-behavior therapy. He also 
pointed out many limitations and criticisms 
of cognitive therapies. These works may be 
useful for religious therapists interested in 
using cognitive-behavior interventions incor-
porating spiritual dimensions with religious 
clients. 
Matching techniques to specific clients 
may require more than additional research. 
Existing research methodologies result in 
global assessments rather than yielding spe-
cific technique variations that might be at-
tempted in response to ideological differ-
ences of religious clients. For example, we 
know that religious imagery is more effective 
than nonreligious imagery in dealing with re-
ligious clients (Propst, 1980a), but we do not 
know which specific religious ideologies 
make the imagery technique most advisable. 
Some religious clients will reject any kind of 
imagery technique because of recent Chris-
tian writings opposed to imagery of all kinds 
(Hunt, 1987; Hunt & McMahon, 1985). Until 
our research methodologies are sufficiently 
refined to address more specific effectiveness 
questions, these questions must be ad-
dressed by reporting experience-based ob-
servations. Below, we outline specific areas 
of ideological conflict observed in doing cog-
nitive therapy with religious clients and sug-
gest appropriate technique modification. In 
each case, we conclude the collaborative ele-
ments of cognitive therapy (Beck, Rush, 
Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Meichenbaum, 1977) 
to be preferable over more confrontive ap-
proaches, such as rational-emotive therapy. 
Ideological Obstacles with 
Religious Clients 
Sell-Interest and Self-Direction 
Ellis (1971) asserted that self-interest and 
self-direction are qualities of emotionally 
healthy individuals. Because religious clients 
have neither, according to Ellis 0971), they 
are not emotionally healthy. One goal of ra-
tional-emotive therapy is to help the client 
become healthier by acting more upon per-
sonal interests (Ellis, 1980). 
As Ellis (1971) suggested, some religious 
clients are opposed to concepts of self-inter-
est. Biblical passages such as the following 
seem to counter goals of self-interest: 
"Whoever finds his life will lose it, and who-
ever loses his life for my sake will find it" 
(Matt. 10:39); "Whatever was to my profit I 
nm.Z: consider loss for the sake of Christ" 
(Phil. 3:7). 
Many religious clients see self-sacrifice as 
a higher calling than self-interest. Rather than 
disputing this belief, it is most useful to focus 
on locus of control and issues of choice. 
Clients who choose to give up a right or priv-
ilege in order to help another will feel differ-
ently than those who believe they must give 
up a right or privilege. The former will en-
gage in reinforcing self-talk while the latter 
will feel deprived. 
Ellis 0971) is misguided in describing reli-
gious clients as less self-directed, accepting 
less responsibility for themselves. While 
some studies have shown no relation be-
tween locus of control and religiosity (Ben-
son & Spilka, 1973; Berman & Hays, 1973; 
Friedberg & Friedberg, 1985; Sexton, Leak, & 
Toenies, 1980), some have shown religious 
individuals to be more internal (Shrauger & 
Silverman, 1971; Silvestri, 1979; Strickland & 
Shaffer, 1971), indicating that religious indi-
viduals expect to have at least as much con-
trol over themselves as nonreligious individ-
uals. Thus, it is unreasonable to conclude, as 
Ellis does, that religious individuals accept 
less responsibility. 
Overtly trying to change a religious client 
to be more self-interested and self-directed 
will probably result in resistance. Christian 
clients often come to therapy with concerns 
that their values will be attacked or 
lenged (Worthington, 1986). Rather tha 
fronting or challenging their values, 
clients' belief systems and trying to 
them focus on locus of control will be 
useful. Clients will be more likely to 
unreasonable expectations of Lvu"''dl.LL 
sacrifice if therapists focus on 
choice rather than directly confronting 
Beck's (Beck et al., 1979) use of 
rative empiricism is useful here. 
believe they need to always be 
test their assumptions by 
For example, they might watch closely 
tor or religious leader to see if he or 
always selfless. Their beliefs will 
become more reasonable as they 
indicating that complete selflessness 
hopeless ideal and as those data are 
ered in a supportive therapeutic Pnmr,nru 
When doing collaborative 
religious clients, it is often important 
data collection occur within the 
the client's religious environment. 
0985) indicated that the authority for 
ing cognitions may reside in oneself, 
consensus, or expert authority. Since 
liefs of religious clients often come 
pert authority (pastor, Bible, God, etc. 
important to involve that authority in 
orative empirical efforts. Having 
clients verify thoughts by observing 
haviors of Christian leaders or finding 
priate Scripture passages is often 
cause these sources are held in a 
Rigid Thinking 
Both rational-emotive therapy (Ellis, 
and cognitive therapy for depression 
1976) postulate that self-statements 
dichotomous thinking or arbitrary " 
are emotionally disruptive. Changing 
statements" involves teaching clients 
come more scientific in their thinking. 
often involves confrontation in 
tive therapy and collaborative 
cognitive therapy for depression. 
gious clients, should statements are 
ficult to modify because of the 
which they are based, especially since 
of depressed individuals are likely 
on illogical justification (Cook & 
1986). Illogic and high authority for 
"'':'L"-"'~w is a difficult combination to counter. 
Confronting should statements in a threat-
way may present problems for the 
therapist working with religious 
This is especially true early in ther-
since initial responses to cognitive ther-
apy seem to play an important role in out-
, Fennell & Teasdale (1987) found that 
,,,nvc•~ slow responders to cognitive therapy 
began with skepticism about the role of 
in overcoming depression had 
''"'"'""rPr long-term treatment outcome. Con-
skeptical clients might easily be per-
as criticism, preventing the necessary 
'""''-u·~~ alliance. This is especially likely 
since religious clients often bring irrational 
beliefs about psychology into therapy 
(Rayburn, 1985). These beliefs require ac-
cepting attitudes on the part of therapists. 
Some "shoulds" of religious clients repre-
sent unrealistic demands for perfection. For 
, ~xample, "I should always be nice to every-
one I meet" or "I should never be angry" are 
unrealistic self-demands. Perfection demands, 
· in turn, are likely to precipitate depression 
(Hewitt & Dyck, 1986), anxiety and anger 
'{Zwemer & Deffenbacher, 1984). Rossi 
(1985) suggested that successful therapy for 
religious clients often involves an examina-
, :don of their perfectionistic tendencies. 
Collaborative empiricism can also be used 
with should statements and the tendency to-
religious perfectionism. For example, a 
client might agree to find biblical 
that he or she should never be 
. The client might also look for biblical 
that anger is acceptable under 
circumstances. Alternatively, the client 
interview religious leaders to get their 
and experiences. 
Another strategy, consistent with Meichen-
cognitive-behavioral therapy, is to re-
a client's religious script. For example, 
of us worked with a client whose de-
seemed directly connected to her 
s~/~"i'1Jers that she was an inadequate Christian. 
productive session was spend collabo-
ely reviewing the internal script she used 
n sitting in church. Her pastor, who ap-
parently was quite negative and critical in 
most sermons, evoked many negative self-
statements in her. She told herself, "Other 
Christians are more committed than I am," "If 
I was really a Christian I would do more 
things for the church," and so on. Several 
subsequent sessions were spent looking at 
emotional consequences of the thoughts and 
eventually she decided she wanted to learn 
another script. In her new script, she inter-
nally challenged the words of her pastor 
rather than automatically feeling guilty for 
her inadequacy. She learned the script 
quickly, generalized it to other self-state-
ments, and showed significant gains in ther-
apy. The key was collaborating in evaluating 
the self-talk rather than immediately con-
fronting it as irrational. 
Need for Philosophical Change 
Ellis 0987) recently argued that most cog-
nitive therapies miss the important element 
of identifying and altering the absolutistic de-
mands clients place on themselves. He then 
concluded that rational-emotive therapy is 
more satisfactory than other cognitive thera-
pies because it allows clients to have deeper 
philosophical changes in their thinking. 
Earlier, Ellis (1971) argued that religious indi-
viduals are not emotionally healthy individu-
als. He himself is a probabilistic atheist and 
he believes these religious values to be the 
most satisfactory for good emotional health 
(Ellis, 1980). 
Ellis' suggestion is antithetical to the point 
of this article. In fact, this is precisely the 
point of contention we have with Ellis . 
Whereas he argues that devout religious val-
ues need to be changed in order for mental 
health to be attained, we believe the philo-
sophical beliefs of religious clients can often 
be maintained throughout effective cognitive 
therapy by using appropriate collaboration. 
For example, Ellis (1980) argued that blam-
ing oneself is irrational and can only come 
from unhealthy absolute standards of right 
and wrong. But many religious clients have 
absolute standards of right and wrong, based 
on written authority or religious leaders, and 
blame themselves for violating those stan-
dards. To argue that one cannot be emotion-
ally healthy within the context of absolute 
standards of right and wrong is to overlook 
the millions of emotionally healthy religious 
individuals who never seek psychological 
help. There have been differing opinions 
about whether religious thinking contributes 
to psychopathology (Bergin, 1980; Ellis, 
1971; London, 1976; McLemore & Court, 
1977; Walls, 1980), but the most definitive 
empirical study is Bergin's (1983) critical 
evaluation and meta-analysis demonstrating 
that religious individuals have no more psy-
chopathology than do nonreligious individu-
als. Moreover, Donahue's (1985) review indi-
cates that intrinsic religiousness is unrelated 
to negative personality characteristics. 
The goal of cognitive therapy is to imple-
ment some philosophical changes in the way 
clients view their world. However, Ellis' as-
sumptions that devout religious philosophies 
need to be altered (Ellis, 1984) is not consis-
tent with pastoral or Christian therapy 
(Wessler, 1984). 
Helping clients determine which philo-
sophical changes to pursue needs to be a 
collaborative effort. One can test whether or 
not an absolutistic belief system requires 
change. If a belief system necessitates de-
pression, then everyone with that belief sys-
tem will be depressed. Otherwise, individual 
cognitive differences or some noncognitive 
factors account for the client's depression. 
Beck's cognitive therapy and Meichen-
baum's cognitive-behavioral therapy do not 
ignore philosophical realities. But rather than 
searching for a global form of absolutistic 
thinking, Beck and Meichenbaum advocate 
searching for individualized scripts or schema, 
beliefs about the world based upon past 
learning. Although these schema may some-
times relate to religious views, effective treat-
ment doesn't necessarily require the client to 
abandon absolutistic thinking altogether. 
Conclusion 
The empirical data on cognitive therapy 
with religious clients are sparse. It appears 
that religious imagery is useful for some reli-
gious clients and that cognitive therapy re-
mains effective when modified into a reli-
gious form. However, two best-selling 
Christian books (Hunt, 1987; 
McMahon, 1985) have recently 
chologists' use of imagery, so 
ward imagery, even religious · 
be a factor in working with some 
Regardless of lacking empirical 
subtle dimensions of doing cognitive 
with religious clients cannot be 
plored with current research 
Thus, we have observed, based on 
experience, some ideological 
doing cognitive therapy with religious 
With each obstacle we have pointed 
importance of using collaborative 
therapy. By using Beck's technique of 
orative empiricism or Meichenbaum's 
orative therapeutic style, clients can be 
vated to evaluate their beliefs in a 
way. Excessive confrontation, especially 
a nonreligious therapist, may produce 
tance rather than progress. We tend to 
with Marzillier (1987): 
A frontal attack on highly cherished beliefs will, 
lieve, tend to lead to greater resistance to change 
response to the overwhelming barrage from 
therapist, a token surrender that does not lead to 
or substantive belief change. (p. 150) 
Cognitive therapy is an effective 
for depression, anxiety, and other 
ders-that has been determined. We 
need to turn our attention to more 
questions of applying cognitive 
to our clients, many of whom have 
orientations. Beck's and Meichenbaum' 
phasis on collaboration in therapy 
be more promising than the directive 
confrontive approaches of 
therapy. 
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